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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze the relative importance and mutual behavior of two competing base-load electricity generation options 
that each are capable of contributing significantly to the abatement of global CO2 emissions: nuclear energy and coal-based 
power production complemented with CO2 capture and storage (CCS). We also investigate how, in scenarios developed with an 
integrated assessment model that simulates the economics of a climate-constrained world, the prospects for nuclear energy would 
change if exogenous limitations on the spread of nuclear technology were relaxed. Using the climate change economics model 
WITCH we find that until 2050 the growth rates of nuclear electricity generation capacity would become comparable to historical 
rates observed during the 1980s. Given that nuclear energy continues to face serious challenges and contention, we inspect how 
extensive the improvements of coal-based power equipped with CCS technology would need to be if our economic optimization 
model is to significantly scale down the construction of new nuclear power plants. 
©  Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved 
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1. Introduction2
The development of nuclear power has experienced significant hindrance from concerns over three main 
categories of issues that are intrinsically related to its use: reactor accidents, radioactive waste and nuclear 
proliferation. Arguments regarding economic competition and public opinion, and more recently terrorist activity, 
add to the obstacles faced by the civil use of nuclear energy for electricity generation. These fundamental drawbacks 
of nuclear energy have been the principal cause for this power production option not to have expanded as widely as 
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predicted decades ago by many energy specialists, while when launched in the 1960s it was portrayed as a 
promising energy alternative and foreseen by some to potentially fulfill much of mankind’s future energy needs. 
Nonetheless, in recent years the debate over the role of nuclear power has revived, particularly as a result of high 
current fuel prices and likely future threats emanating from global climate change. Even after the recent financial 
crisis, we are likely to see an increase in the construction of nuclear power plants world-wide over the years to 
come. Before the start of this crisis in the Fall of 2008, particularly countries in Asia (among which China, India, 
Japan and South Korea) were reported to have large nuclear capacity expansion plans for the short to medium term 
(IEA, 2008). Today countries with ambitious and increasingly concrete nuclear energy plans can also and especially 
be found in the Middle East. 
In this paper we report how we used the WITCH model to investigate how in a climate-constrained world the 
prospects for nuclear energy would change if the commonly imposed restrictions on technological growth are 
relaxed (for details on the WITCH model see e.g. Bosetti et al., 2006). Given that nuclear energy continues to 
remain unpopular in several countries, largely for reasons related to its inalienable risks, we also evaluate the 
improvements of its main base-load electricity production competitor – coal-fired power plants complemented with 
CCS technology – needed to significantly scale down the prospects for nuclear power on purely (non-constrained) 
economic grounds. Bosetti et al. (2009) evaluate with WITCH the optimal portfolio of investments in energy 
technology deployment and energy R&D, from an economic viewpoint, for a range of climate stabilization 
scenarios. This paper extends their work by explicitly focusing on the role of nuclear electricity vis-à-vis other non-
carbon power generation technologies and coal-based electricity production complemented with CCS in particular. 
In section 2 of this paper we very briefly describe some of our main assumptions in the climate change integrated 
assessment model WITCH that we use for our analysis. Section 3 presents our scenario results, based on tests with 
regard to the slackening of diffusion limitations for new nuclear electricity generation capacity. Section 4 reports the 
techno-economic advancements for CCS technology needed to downsize the deployment of nuclear energy on 
competitive grounds. Section 5 presents a discussion of our findings and draws our main conclusions. 
2. The WITCH model 
The World Induced Technical Change Hybrid (WITCH) model, developed by the climate change team at FEEM, 
has been extensively used for the investigation of climate-related research subjects.3 It belongs to the collection of 
integrated assessment models dedicated to enhancing our understanding of the economic implications of climate 
change mitigation policies. These models allow for determining economically efficient strategies to achieve a broad 
range of possible climate control targets. With respect to other models of a similar kind – now widely used for the 
numerical analysis of energy-climate-economy interactions, notably as part of ongoing work for the IPCC – WITCH 
has a series of features that place it in a position to capture additional aspects of the climate change conundrum. 
Given that the focus of this paper is on the power sector (and given our assumption that hydropower is little 
expandable on a global basis), the three most prominent essentially carbon-free technologies are coal-based power 
plants equipped with CCS, nuclear power plants, and electricity generation based on renewables (that consist of a 
bundle of wind and solar energy). Tavoni and van der Zwaan (2009) provides our main techno-economic 
assumptions for these technologies. Nuclear energy and IGCC plants complemented with CCS technology are 
described by rather similar parameter values in some respects: relatively high investment costs and a high utilization 
factor as typical for base-load electricity production. Coal reserves are assumed to be abundant, with an equilibrium 
price not exceeding 80$/t throughout the century in a business-as-usual (BAU) coal-intensive scenario. Similarly, 
uranium is assumed to be sufficiently abundant at low prices to satisfy a significant revival of the nuclear industry 
during the 21st century (Bunn et al., 2005). The cost of uranium is modeled endogenously via resource extraction 
curves. Reserves are assumed to be particularly large at prices up to a level of approximately 300$/kg, at which 
point reprocessing spent fuel and the use of fast breeder reactors become competitive (hence preventing any further 
rise in the price of uranium and corresponding cost increase of nuclear energy). In order to be used as fissile 
material, uranium ore must undergo a process of conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication; we have set the 
corresponding cost at 250$/kg (see MIT, 2003). Nuclear waste storage and management fees are assumed to 
3
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increase linearly with the quantity of spent fuel produced and are set at 0.1 ¢/kWh (MIT, 2003). For CCS, CO2
transport and storage costs are accounted for via regional supply curves calibrated on data available in Hendriks et 
al. (2004). The fraction of CO2 captured is supposed to be 90% and a zero geological CO2 leakage rate is assumed. 
Wind and solar energy are characterized by relatively low investment costs, but also by a low load or utilization 
factor. They are the only technologies that we assume to be subject to significant technological change through 
learning-by-doing: especially for solar power plants it is expected that there is substantial scope for further 
improvements in competitiveness. We therefore assume that wind and solar power are subject to progress in such a 
way that each doubling of cumulative installed capacity leads to an investment cost reduction of 13%. This is a 
rather conservative value in comparison to learning rates observed in practice, because we argue learning will not 
continue indefinitely (IEA, 2000; Ferioli and van der Zwaan, 2009). 
3. Scenario results 
In addition to a BAU scenario, under median assumptions on population growth and economic development and 
central values for a range of energy technology parameters and their evolution over time, we model two policy 
scenarios, consistent with the stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at 450 and 550 ppm. For all 
greenhouse gases combined, we assume that these concentrations roughly correspond to 550 and 650 ppm-e (CO2-
equivalent) stabilization scenarios respectively. These two scenarios are thus compatible with a stabilization of the 
global average atmospheric temperature at an increase of 2.5 and 3 ºC, respectively, if the climate sensitivity is 
lower than 3 ºC. Although the IPCC suggests a considerably more stringent target of 2 ºC, both scenarios imply very 
significant emission reductions. Global emissions are assumed to peak in 2015 for the 450 ppm case and in 2050 for 
the 550 ppm case, while cumulative mitigation throughout the century would amount to over 1100 and 750 GtCO2
respectively. Because of the convexity of the marginal abatement cost curve in our model, the additional effort 
needed to achieve the most stringent target would come at a considerably and disproportionally higher price. The 
scenarios are run up to 2150, but for our present purposes it suffices to report results until 2050 only. The reference 
year for our optimization runs is 2005. While under these climate control scenarios the development of all power 
generation options are affected, either negatively (as with the carbon-intensive options) or positively (the carbon-
poor alternatives), with respect to the BAU run, we inspect for our purposes here three (clusters of) technologies 
only: nuclear power, coal with CCS, and renewables (wind and solar energy combined). 
Figure 1. WITCH simulations of future capacity additions of nuclear power (in GW/yr) in BAU, 450 and 550 ppm 
scenarios, as well as realized during 1985-2005. The “single year” point shows the historic maximum realized.
Figure 1 shows the simulation by WITCH of the 5-year averages of annual capacity additions (excluding the 
replacement of ageing existing capacity) for nuclear power until 2050 under each of the three scenarios. The values 
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of the annual additions as realized over the past two decades are also plotted, as well as the historic single-year 
maximum attained during this time frame. We see that in the BAU scenario nuclear power additions over the 
forthcoming decades reach a value of over 10 GW/yr, while in recent years this annual new capacity did not amount 
to more than a few GW/yr at most. This result connects to the reality in several countries with rapid economic 
growth, like (but not exclusively) China and India, where increased interest exists for this power production option 
for reasons of competitive costs, energy security and air pollution control. Figure 1 also shows that under a 550 ppm 
climate stabilization scenario this new capacity deployment is significantly enhanced to a level of 15-20 GW/yr, and 
reaches a value of over 35 GW/yr by the middle of the century under a 450 ppm scenario. In the 550 ppm scenario, 
annual additions of nuclear capacity reach the level observed in the 1980s, while in the 450 ppm scenario they 
obtain after several decades a value consistently similar to the one-year high of 1985. The explanation for this rapid 
expansion of nuclear power is of course the fact that nuclear energy emits essentially no CO2, and that the carbon 
price needed to achieve emission reductions coherent with the indicated climate targets is substantial and grows fast. 
For example, in the stringent 450 ppm scenario, the marginal cost of CO2 abatement exceeds 100$/tCO2 already in 
2030 and grows markedly after that. This growth in the value of CO2 naturally provides a large incentive for the 
deployment of CO2-free technologies for power generation, a sector characterized by marginal abatement costs less 
steep than other parts of the economy such as the transportation sector. Total installed capacity for nuclear power in 
2050 amounts to roughly 1150 and 1500 GW for the 550 and 450 ppm cases respectively. These numbers are 
somewhat higher in comparison to estimates reported in, for example, Vaillancourt et al. (2008), who determine a 
nuclear capacity of about 1000 GW in a 450 ppm scenario and slightly lower numbers for 550 ppm and BAU cases. 
The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2008), which analyzes scenarios with somewhat different climate 
objectives, projects nuclear capacity in 2050 to lie between 860 and 1150 GW.  
Figure 2. WITCH simulations of future capacity additions of coal-based power plus CCS (in GW/yr) under BAU, 
450 and 550 ppm scenarios, as well as realized without CCS during 1985-2005. The “single year” point shows the 
historic maximum realized.
Figure 2 shows the same results for the development of coal-based electricity generation equipped with and 
without CCS technology (note the larger vertical scale). CCS technology is obviously not economical without a 
price on CO2, as demonstrated by the horizontal line for BAU, but experiences a widespread application under either 
a 450 or 550 ppm climate stabilization target. Under a 550 ppm scenario in less than two decades as much as 
30 GW/yr additional coal-based power plants are (fully) equipped with CCS technology until at least the middle of 
the century (and in fact much beyond). Typically this level of annual additions equals the average number of new 
coal-based power plants (without CCS) built since the 1990s. Under a 450 ppm climate target the use of CCS 
explodes initially, reaching a peak around 2020 of over 40 GW/yr of additional capacity. This exceedingly high 
level (although still below the record level of non-CCS coal-based power plants taken in operation in 2005) vanishes 
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over time, however, given that the low but non-zero CO2 emission rate of coal plus CCS power is penalized by 
progressively stringent climate obligations (instead of which totally carbon-free technologies are preferred).4
Nonetheless, for both climate policies the deployment of CCS becomes very significant, and reaches a level as high 
as 550 GtCO2 of cumulative storage by the end of the century, with a world average transport and storage cost by 
then of about 25 $/tCO2. 
As extensively described in the literature, it is unlikely that one or a couple of CO2 abatement options alone can 
address any reasonable level of climate control (IPCC, 2007). Indeed, in Tavoni and van der Zwaan (2009) we 
confirm that renewables such as wind energy and solar power are strong favorites as necessary additional mitigation 
options (notably in regions with large wind and solar radiation potentials). Even under BAU conditions, wind and 
solar power continue their surge, and easily more than double over the forthcoming decades in terms of annual 
power additions from the present value of about 5 GW/yr. When global climate policy is adhered to, renewables will 
grow much faster: their additions may even exponentially increase to values over 30 GW/yr by 2050 in the case of a 
450 ppm climate objective. Such stringent climate policy would rapidly render renewable energy at a similar footing 
as the traditional options currently in use, as a result of its increased competitiveness following policy-induced 
learning-by-doing effects. For the moment, however, renewables are still characterized by a relatively low 
deployment rate in absolute terms, due to their high early investment costs and low capacity factors, especially for 
solar energy. 
Our overall observation is that each of these three types of power technologies – nuclear energy, coal plus CCS, 
and renewables – is needed for serious climate change control, in addition to extensive efficiency and savings 
efforts. In order to reach CO2 emission reduction targets that avoid increasing the atmospheric CO2 concentration to 
more than 450 or 550 ppm, at least two of these three options are needed at a globally very large scale, and most 
probably all three (and more). We also see that, when the commonly applied growth constraints on nuclear power 
are relaxed, it is expanded rapidly but with rates not exceeding much the levels experienced in the past. Indeed, we 
find that the nuclear energy growth rates generated by WITCH are generally consistent with those observed during 
the 1970s and 1980s, i.e. when nuclear power was in its heydays and experienced a more favorable attitude than it 
did over the past two decades. Compatible results can be found in Bosetti et al. (2009). 
4. Implications and alternatives 
All scenarios depicted in Figure 1 foresee an expansion of the total capacity of nuclear energy over the coming 
half-century. In the 450 ppm case, for example, the available nuclear power in 2050 is increased by about a factor of 
three with respect to the currently installed global capacity of 370 GW. What does this imply for nuclear energy? 
The simulated growth paths for nuclear energy respond, along with other non-carbon energy resources, to the 
challenge of mitigating global climate change while simultaneously generating benefits in terms of air pollution 
reduction and energy security enhancement. Such an expansion would also spur innovation in the nuclear industry, 
and generate incentives to develop and deploy new reactors of e.g. generation III and eventually generation IV 
types. These can profit from technological improvements with respect to reactors presently in operation (see e.g. van 
der Zwaan, 2008). In economic terms an expansion of the nuclear sector could produce economies-of-scale, with 
corresponding cost reductions. Troublesome, however, is that an expansion of nuclear power would exacerbate the 
already serious concerns regarding its use at current levels, that is, in terms of the ‘classical’ intricacies associated 
with this power generation option: reactor accidents, radioactive waste and nuclear proliferation. 
More reactors in operation world-wide enhance in principle the probability that with one of them a serious 
incident or accident occurs, especially when considering that an important share of the additions of nuclear capacity 
will probably take place in countries with still limited reactor operation experience and yet to be perfected safety 
standards. It has been pointed out, however, that while the chance for accidents remains unequal to zero, the 
likelihood for such events has reduced significantly over the past decades and should engender less concern today 
than it did in the 1980s (Sailor et al., 2000). Also, both through more advanced reactor designs and improved 
operation standards, risks for serious accidents are likely to continue to decrease in the future. 
4
 A higher CO2 capture rate or the use of CCS in conjunction with biomass would allow CCS to remain competitive in a stringent climate 
scenario beyond 2050. 
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While radioactive waste production occurs at basically every stage of the nuclear fuel cycle, in solid, liquid or 
gaseous state, spent fuel is most problematic, since it generates heat during many years after de-loading from the 
reactor core and remains highly radioactive for thousands of years. Radioactive contamination of the environment 
from spent fuel storage can be minimized through several layers of physical containment, probably at some stage 
including reversible geological deposition deep underground. While progress on deep geological disposal has been 
made in e.g. Finland, France and Sweden, many governments delay decisions on this subject and instead adopt 
strategies of intermediate aboveground bunker or dry cask storage like in the Netherlands and the US. The main 
issue concerning underground storage remains uncertainty about the integrity of spent fuel canisters: it is questioned 
whether the isolation offered by geological formations will be sufficient over a period of thousands of years. The 
fear is that canisters, as a result of corrosion, will leak and consequently contaminate groundwater in the far future. 
Several channels exist through which this problem could be mitigated, in particular by organizing the disposal of 
waste regionally through Internationally Monitored Waste Repositories (IMWRs). As long as international solutions 
for the storage of waste continue to be delayed, however, or other solutions are not brought forward to tackle the 
intrinsic waste problematique of nuclear energy, its role in future power supply remains significantly handicapped. 
A possible expansion of nuclear energy worldwide would continue to give substantial reason for concern (van der 
Zwaan, 2002 and 2008). 
Nuclear power generation inherently involves the risk that nuclear industry related technologies and materials are 
diverted for non-civil purposes. Among nuclear energy’s main proliferation threats are the use of uranium 
enrichment facilities and the production of fissile materials like plutonium (see notably IPFM, 2007). Countries 
operating enrichment technology or organized terrorist groups possessing highly enriched uranium (HEU) may 
relatively easily construct a basic fission explosive device and use it for military or terrorist purposes. Several 
plutonium isotopes contained in reactor-grade spent fuel, accounting for 1-2% of its volume, are fissile and can 
serve to fabricate a nuclear weapon. Especially when spent fuel from the civil nuclear industry is reprocessed, this 
problem becomes apparent: plutonium contained in spent fuel is reasonably safe against diversion for weapons use 
because of the highly radioactive waste materials in which it is embedded, but its separation during reprocessing 
makes it vulnerable for direct military or terrorist use, even while it is of lower quality than weapon-grade 
plutonium. The global control of sensitive technologies, the monitoring of nuclear activities and safeguarding and 
deletion of fissile materials, like HEU and plutonium, are central to any solution of the nuclear proliferation 
problem. In order to avoid fissile materials being diverted for non-civil purposes, dedicated technical efforts and 
effective international institutions are required. Their improvement is important irrespective of the future share of 
nuclear energy in total power production, but will become more poignant when nuclear energy experiences a 
renaissance. 
Suppose that for the reasons just given one finds an expansion of nuclear energy unacceptable, especially with 
annual additions over the coming 50 years that may run in the 15-20 GW/yr, under a 550 ppm climate control 
scenario, and that may increase to 35 GW/yr in the 450 ppm scenario. What then would be the improvements that 
need to materialize for other non-carbon options in order to let them dominate or scale down the spread of nuclear 
power in the solution set of WITCH, that is, without the imposition of ex-ante growth constraints? In other words, 
can one crowd out nuclear power off the market by rendering other carbon-free electricity generation options 
economically more attractive and thereby more competitive? What sort of improvements need to be accomplished in 
order to avoid the widespread expansion of nuclear energy that many reject for the above listed set of ‘classical’ 
arguments?  
We address these questions by focusing on the combustion of coal for power production complemented with 
CCS, since we believe it is becoming one of the most direct competitors of nuclear power (much like nuclear energy 
and oil-based power were main competitors in the 1970s and 1980s until the last was essentially phased out as a 
result of broad deployment of the former; see Toth and Rogner, 2006). Indeed, coal-based power generation plus 
CCS and nuclear energy are both base-load electricity production options. We focus on three potential areas of 
improvement for CCS technology by distinguishing three cases of assumptions: 
• CCS+: the CO2 emission capture rate is raised from 90% to 99%, making CCS an essentially zero-
emission technology; 
• CCS++: in addition, transport and storage costs do not exceed 12 $/tCO2, i.e. the availability of suitable 
repositories is very large; 
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• CCS+++: in addition, CCS investment costs gradually decrease until a 50% reduction over the course of 
20 years. 
We abstain from associating probabilities to the achievability of these three CCS scenarios (but guess that the 
CCS+++ case may be very hard to materialize). In Tavoni and van der Zwaan (2009) we revise Figure 1 for the 
simulated nuclear energy expansion for these three CCS-favorable cases under the 450 ppm scenario. We conclude 
that each of these three cases generates a reduced reliance on nuclear power for climate control purposes. We also 
see, however, that even in the most optimistic case for CCS technology, nuclear energy will still be needed at annual 
additions of about 20 GW/yr. This level thus constitutes a sort of bottom-line requirement for nuclear power. In 
Tavoni and van der Zwaan (2009) we also shows our results for the 550 ppm scenario under the same three cases of 
progress in the development of CCS technology. Like for the 450 ppm scenario, a reduced reliance on nuclear power 
for climate management materializes, with the same ranking between the three cases. Overall, however, the 
differences between the three cases are less pronounced, the explanation for which is the less ambitious climate 
control target. Under this scenario even in the most optimistic case for the amelioration of CCS, nuclear energy will 
still be needed at a minimum threshold level of annual additions of approximately 15 GW/yr. In these new CCS-plus 
scenarios, the evolution of nuclear energy over the coming half-century never drops below the BAU reference curve 
shown in Figure 1. In Tavoni and van der Zwaan (2009) we also assess what our results imply for the amounts of 
electricity generated by nuclear energy and coal-based power equipped with CCS, via existing capacity plus the 
installed additions as simulated by WITCH. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
Under a stringent climate control target in an otherwise unconstrained world for economic growth, integrated 
assessment models tend to be favorable for a widespread deployment of nuclear energy in the power sector. Usually, 
analysts either consider a large expansion of nuclear power unrealistic or for other reasons prefer to avoid their 
scenario runs to yield an outcome concentrating considerably on nuclear energy. Consequently, specific technology 
diffusion constraints are introduced to limit the expansion of nuclear power. Such boundary conditions, however, 
tend to have a significant impact on the economic performance of climate policy.  
The increasing necessity to achieve globally significant CO2 emission reductions, imminently and affordably, is 
beneficial for the prospects of nuclear energy. Whether one favors an expansion of nuclear power or not, this energy 
supply option emits essentially no CO2, or at least very low levels even when considering the entire nuclear fuel 
cycle. The analysis presented in this paper shows that if in the model WITCH, and probably in other numerical 
models designed for the integrated assessment of the economics of climate change, no growth constraints are 
imposed on the deployability of nuclear energy, this technology could well experience the renaissance that is 
predicted by some analysts. We demonstrate that nuclear power can at most be part of the solution to global climate 
change and does not constitute a silver bullet. Hence, if at all, it needs to be employed in conjunction with (probably 
many) other CO2 mitigation options (as also described in van der Zwaan, 2002). Nuclear energy could become a 
significant necessary part of the total solution, if agreed climate targets are as stringent as 450-550 ppm CO2
stabilization levels. In particular, we show that under these climate-constrained scenarios the expansion rate of 
nuclear energy during the forthcoming 50 years does probably not need to largely exceed the growth rates as 
experienced during the heydays of nuclear energy deployment in the early 1980s. 
While the nuclear expansion rates calculated in this study could resolve significant part of the global climate 
change challenge, and would possess benefits in other domains such as reducing air pollution and diminishing 
energy dependence in many countries, from several perspectives an increase in the use of nuclear energy as 
simulated by WITCH would be of serious concern, notably in terms of radioactive waste and nuclear proliferation. 
We demonstrate that the technological and economic improvement of CCS required to significantly scale down the 
expansion needs of nuclear energy is certainly not negligible. Yet a better CO2 capture rate, as well as reduced CO2
storage and CCS investment costs, would allow CCS to overtake nuclear energy as leading cost-efficient mitigation 
technology in the base-load power sector.  
5836 B.v. der Zwaan, M. Tavoni / Energy Procedia 4 (2011) 5830–5837
8 Author name / Energy Procedia 00 () 000–000 
6. References 
Bosetti, V., C. Carraro, M. Galeotti, E. Massetti, M. Tavoni (2006). “WITCH: A World Induced Technical Change 
Hybrid Model”, The Energy Journal, Special Issue on “Hybrid Modelling of Energy Environment Policies: 
Reconciling Bottom-up and Top-down”, 13-38. 
Bosetti, V., C. Carraro, E. Massetti, A. Sgobbi and M.Tavoni (2009) "Optimal Energy Investment and R&D 
Strategies to Stabilise Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric Concentrations", Resource and Energy Economics 31-2, 
123-137. 
Bunn, M., S. Fetter, J.P. Holdren and B.C.C. van der Zwaan, “The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal 
of Spent Nuclear Fuel”, Nuclear Technology, 150, June, 2005, 209-230. 
Ferioli, F., K. Schoots and B.C.C. van der Zwaan, “Use and Limitations of Learning Curves for Energy Technology 
Policy: a Component-Learning Hypothesis”, Energy Policy, 37, 2009, 2525-2535. 
Hendriks, C., W. Graus, and F.V. Bergen (2002). “Global Carbon Dioxide Storage Potential Costs”, Report EEP 
02001, Ecofys, Utrecht, The Netherlands. 
IEA (2000). Experience Curves for Energy Technology Policy. OECD/IEA, Paris. 
IEA (2008). Energy Technology Perspectives 2008. OECD/IEA, Paris. 
IPCC, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change (2007.) Working Group III Report “Mitigation 
of Climate Change”, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
IPFM, International Panel on Fissile Materials (2007) “Global Fissile Material Report 2007” Second report of the 
IPFM, Princeton University. 
MIT, (2003). “The future of nuclear power: an interdisciplinary MIT study” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Cambridge, USA. 
Sailor, W. C., D. Bodansky, C. Braun, S. Fetter and B.C.C. van der Zwaan (2000). “A Nuclear Solution to Climate 
Change?”, Science, 288, 1177-1178. 
Tavoni M., and B.C.C. van der Zwaan (2009), “Nuclear versus Coal plus CCS: a comparison of two competitive 
base-load climate control options”, FEEM, Nota di Lavoro, 2009-100. 
Toth, F.L., H.-H. Rogner (2006). “Oil and nuclear power: past, present, and future”, Energy Economics, 28, 1-25. 
Vaillancourt, K., M. Labriet, R. Loulou, and J.P. Waaub (2008). “The role of nuclear energy in long-term climate 
scenarios: An analysis with the World-TIMES model” Energy Policy, 36:7, 2296-2307. 
van der Zwaan, B.C.C. (2002). “Nuclear Energy: Tenfold Expansion or Phaseout?”, Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, 69, 287-307. 
van der Zwaan, B.C.C. (2008). “Prospects for Nuclear Energy in Europe”, International Journal of Global Energy 
Issues, 30, 1/2/3/4, 102-121. 
B.v. der Zwaan, M. Tavoni / Energy Procedia 4 (2011) 5830–5837 5837
